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Providing Relief to the Victims of Military
Medicine: A New Challenge to the Application of
the Feres Doctrine in Military Medical Malpractice
Cases
In 1982, while in the second trimester of her pregnancy, Joyce
Atkinson entered a hospital in Hawaii complaining of blurred vi-
sion, hypertension and edema.' She was sent home, but returned
three days later reporting dizziness, nausea and hypertension.2
Again she was sent home.3 After another two weeks, Atkinson re-
turned to the same hospital with complaints of severe abdominal
pain.' This time she was admitted and diagnosed as having pre-
eclampsia, a condition that is life threatening to both mother and
fetus.5 Atkinson's unborn child died,6 and Atkinson herself suf-
fered permanent physical and emotional injuries.'
While this may appear to be a rather standard medical malprac-
tice case, Joyce Atkinson was denied her day in court to recover for
her personal injuries. Denial was based not on a violation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor because the statute of limita-
tions had run. The basis for the dismissal was that Atkinson was a
Specialist (4th Class) on active duty in the United States Army,
1. Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988).
2. Atkinson, 825 F.2d at 203.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. See also 134 CONG. REC. S4297 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Sasser).
6. Atkinson, 825 F.2d at 203.
7. Id.
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and that the hospital involved was a military medical facility,
Tripler Army Medical Center. This combination of circumstances
was sufficient to trigger the infamous "Feres doctrine"8 which bars
military personnel from recovering under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 9 when "injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service. ' 10
While the field of medical malpractice compensation has greatly
expanded in the past few years, the members of the armed forces
of the United States have been barred from seeking a remedy in
this area. Military personnel are required by fiat to use-only gov-
ernment treatment facilities for nonemergency care.1 Despite the
lack of choice between military and civilian facilities, they are pro-
hibited by the judicially created Feres doctrine from suing the
United States for medical malpractice. 12 As was recognized on the
floor of the House of Representatives, "anybody in the United
States may sue the Federal Government for medical malpractice
except people who are on active duty in the armed services."' s As a
consequence, "a person serving on active duty in peacetime can be
subject to grossly negligent medical malpractice by those hired by
the government to maintain his physical health and well-being -
yet he cannot seek redress in the courts of this land or in the
courts of the military."' 4 This result, according to Congressman
Barney Frank of Massachusetts, "effectively gives military doctors,
clinics and hospitals license to do less than their best and never




The purpose of this comment is to examine the Feres doctrine to
determine whether its basis is valid forty-three years after it was
promulgated. Emphasis will be placed on the application of the
doctrine to the military in light of the current military personnel
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
The original Federal Tort Claims Act,'" ("FTCA"or "Act") en-
8. Id. at 205.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
11. 6320.1A NAVY MED. COM. INST., Enclosure 1 at 9 (June 11, 1987).
12. 135 CONG. REC. H3225 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. James).
13. 135 CONG. REc. H3224 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frank).
14. 135 CONG. REC. S727 (daily ed. January 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
15. 138 CONG. REc. E844, E845 (daily ed. March 26, 1992)(statement of Rep. Frank).
16. 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
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acted by Congress in 1946, effectively waived the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity in tort actions. Although the United
States had consented to be sued in contract disputes since 1887
when the Tucker Act1 7 was adopted, the only effective federal tort
remedy was by passage of a private bill in Congress. The FTCA
provides exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district courts"8 and
permits bench trials only.' 9 The FTCA also requires that, prior to
filing suit, the incident must be brought to the attention of the
appropriate agency within two years of the date of the alleged
wrongdoing.20 If the agency denies the claim, the suit must be filed
with the district court within six months of the agency's disap-
proval of the claim.2'
The statutory purpose of the FTCA is that the United States
should be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. '22 To that end, Con-
gress directed the courts to apply the law of the state where the
alleged tort occurred.2 3 The FTCA specifically retained immunity
for acts or omissions of government employees who use due care to
enforce a statute or regulation. Additionally, government workers
continue to be immune from suit for performing or failing to per-
form a discretionary function or duty, irrespective of whether an
abuse of discretion is established. 4 Permission to sue was ex-
pressly withheld for a number of torts, including assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference
with contract rights.2" The Act also excluded actions by military
and naval personnel arising out of combat actions during wartime 6
or any claim arising in a foreign country.
Despite these statutory prohibitions, the language of the FTCA
was intended by Congress to be read as "sweeping. '28 As a result,
recovery was allowed for the negligent operation of a light house by
17. 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988)).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1988).
21. Id.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
28. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 n.4 (1950).
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the Coast Guard,29 negligent fire fighting by the Forest Service,3"
and claims by federal prisoners for negligent conduct by prison
guards.31 Despite these broad interpretations, the Supreme Court
has excluded military personnel from bringing actions for negli-
gence against the government in cases of medical malpractice or
other torts, when the alleged injury arises out of activity "incident
to service."32
A. The Incident to Service Test: The Early Cases
Judicial interpretation of the FTCA, as it applies to military
personnel, began in 1949 with the case Brooks v. United States.3
In Brooks, U.S. Army personnel were allowed to recover for inju-
ries sustained while off duty, as a result of a collision with an Army
truck.3 4 The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the FTCA
encompassed service personnel by reasoning that since the over-
seas and combat activities of service personnel were specifically ex-
empted, "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did not
have the servicemen in mind. ' 35 In dicta, however, the Brooks
court indicated that attempts by military personnel to recover for
injuries "incident to service" would result in a "wholly different
case." 36 The Supreme Court warned that attempts to recover for
acts that were tied to "incidents of service," might allow "outland-
ish" results that would preclude recovery.37
The next year, in Feres v. United States,3" the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review actions that it considered incident to
service. In Feres, the Court consolidated three cases, two medical
malpractice cases' and a suit alleging that a soldier was negli-
gently quartered in a barracks with a defective heating system.4
The Supreme Court held that all three of these cases were "inci-
dent to service," and fell into the "wholly different case" envi-
29. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
30. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
31. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
32. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
33. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
34. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id. at 53.
38. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
39. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Griggs,
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
40. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
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sioned by Brooks..1 In rejecting the claims of the military mem-
bers, Justice Jackson provided three -reasons fbr the Court's
decision.
First, the Supreme Court noted that the FTCA was not designed
to give rise to new causes of action42 but merely provides that the
"United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 3
The Court reasoned that there was no private right to "conscript
or mobilize a private army with such authorities over persons as
the government vests in echelons of command."" After noting that
no state had allowed members of its militia to maintain tort ac-
tions,45 Justice Jackson found that there was no "parallel liability"
prior to or after the enactment of the FTCA.4e
The second justification for the Feres doctrine was based on the
FTCA's provision that the law where the tort occurred controlled
the existence of liability.47 Here, Justice Jackson questioned the
application of'the law of the state where the alleged tort occurred
because military personnel are subject to successive transfers
throughout the United States and its territories.48 Application of
the state law would then result in service members being "depen-
dent upon geographic considerations over which they have no con-
trol and to laws which fluctuate in existence and value.
'4 9
Finally, the Court noted that the "relationship between the Gov-
ernment and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal
in character'." 50 The Feres Court noted that federal remedies ex-
isted for military personnel to recover for injuries51 and that these
remedies compared favorably with the ones established by state
worker compensation statutes.2 Justice Jackson also noted that
the absence of a set-off between the FTCA and existing military
compensation laws demonstrated a lack of congressional intent
that the FTCA should permit recovery for injuries received inci-
41. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
42. Id. at 141.
43. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988)).
44. Feres, 340 at 141-42.
45. Id. at 142.
46. Id.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
48. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).
51. Id. at 144.
52. Id. at 145.
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dent to military service."
In United States v. Brown,5" decided in 1954, the Court pro-
vided a fourth rationalization for the Feres doctrine that might be
its most important justification. 5 Here, the Court articulated a
concern for the effect of tort actions on the peculiar and special
relationship of military personnel to their superiors and the harms
that could occur if soldiers and sailors were allowed to seek recov-
ery for negligent acts committed by their superior officers.56 The
Brown Court's concern that tort recovery against the United States
would undermine military discipline and effectiveness was adopted
consistently in subsequent cases vindicating the Feres doctrine.
5 7
B. Expansion of the Incident to Service Test
The Feres Doctrine was expanded in Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States,5 8 to prevent third parties from obtaining
indemnity from the United States when the plaintiff was a service
person. In Stencel Aero, a national guard officer was injured by a
failure of his aircraft ejection system .5 He sued the United States
and the aircraft manufacturer, who then cross-claimed against the
United States.60 The district court granted a motion for summary
judgment against the plaintiff and a motion to dismiss Stencel
Aero's cross-claim.6" The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.2
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court noted
that the "relationship between the Government and its suppliers of
ordnance is certainly no less 'distinctively federal in character'
than the relationship between the Government and its soldiers."63
Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the situs of the
negligent act is no more relevant to a government contractor than
53. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
54. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
55. Robert Cooley, Method to This Madness: Acknowledging the Legitimate Ration-
ale Behind the Feres Doctrine, 68 B.U. L. REV. 981, 982-83 (1988).
56. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
'57. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977);
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
58. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
59. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. 666.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 668-69.
62. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882
(1977).
63. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 671.
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to a member of the military, and that no liability will lie on the
part of the government to the contractor for indemnification.6 4
The Court went on to note that the Veteran's Benefits Act 65 not
only provided compensation to the service member, but also
"clothes the Government in the 'protective mantle of the Act's lim-
itation of liability provisions.' "6 Chief Justice Burger also con-
cluded that the effect on military discipline of an action brought
by a soldier against a third party is the same as that which is
brought against the government itself. Specifically, the Chief Jus-
tice reasoned:
[The] issue would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Govern-
ment's agents and the effect upon the serviceman's safety. The trial would,
in either case, involve second-guessing military orders, and would often re-
quire members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's
decisions and actions.
07
The Supreme Court further extended the Feres doctrine in
Chappell v. Wallace. 8 In Chappell, several minority sailors
brought an action against their commanding officer alleging racial
discrimination resulting in the assignment of undesirable duties,
low performance evaluations and the administration of unusually
severe penalties.6 9 The sailors' action was based on the tort remedy
created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,70 which provided relief against federal officers
who deprive others of their constitutional rights under color of fed-
eral law. Bivens expressly provided a caveat to this remedy, how-
ever, stating that a recovery would not lie if "special factors coun-
selling hesitation . . . are present. '71 In Chappell, the Court
reasoned that the Feres doctrine was the "special factor counsel-
ling hesitation" discussed in Bivens and dismissed the action. 72
Chappell relied solely on the reasoning articulated in Brown 7 con-
cerning the negative impact of suits on the "peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors. ' 74 Specifically, Chap-
64. Id.
65. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-663 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
66. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 673 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 673.
68. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
69. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297.
70. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
71. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
72. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
73. Brown, 348 U.S. 110.
74. Id. at 112.
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pell expressed concern over disturbing the distinctive disciplinary
structure of the military establishment 5 and the congressional au-
thority over the military. 6 Interestingly enough, the Court in
Chappell, while upholding the Feres doctrine, did not rely on the
original three justifications of the Feres case, but based its reason-
ing on the military discipline rationale outlined in Brown. 7
The Supreme Court continued its retreat from the original Feres
reasoning in United States v. Shearer.8 In Shearer, the mother of
an off-duty soldier killed by another off-duty soldier brought an
action to recover under the FTCA, claiming that the Army had
been aware of the violent propensities of the murderer but failed
to control him or warn others of his violent behavior."' Finding for
Mrs. Shearer, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit distin-
guished the facts in Shearer from Feres by noting that the dece-
dent was not on base but was in an off-duty status when he was
attacked. 0 In reversing the Third Circuit's decision, Chief Justice
Burger stated that "the situs of the murder is not nearly as impor-
tant as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess
military decisions."81 Again the Court relied on the "peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors" rationale of
Brown,82 rather than the original Feres analysis. The Shearer
Court's concern that such suits "inight impair essential military
discipline, ' 8 3 led it to reject Mrs. Shearer's contention that this
was a "straightforward personnel decision," concluding that "[b]y
whatever name it is called, it is a decision of command."84
The sole reliance of the Chappell and Shearer Courts on the
military discipline concern convinced many lower courts that this
was the only important factor in determining the applicability of
the Feres doctrine.8 5 The Shearer Court appeared to have down-
played the original Feres justifications, indicating that they were
75. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-01.
76. Id. at 301.
77. Cooley, cited at notd 55, at 1002 n.191.
78. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
79. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 52.
80. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102, 1106 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 52
(1985).
81. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 59.
85. John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and
Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 209 (1988).
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"no longer controlling."86 Accordingly, at least one commentator
presumed that "the primary purpose of the Feres doctrine was the
prevention of judicial interference with the effective operation of
the military.
' ' e7
C. The Incident to Service Test Re-emphasized
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning in its next line of
cases. In United States v. Johnson,88 the Court quickly laid to rest
any perception that it was abrogating the original Feres reasoning.
In Johnson, a Coast Guard helicopter pilot crashed into the side of
a mountain while conducting a search and rescue operation for a
pleasure boat lost at sea. At the time of the crash, the helicopter
was under the positive control of a civilian Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration ("FAA") air traffic controller.89 Johnson's widow filed
a suit under the FTCA based on the controller's negligence.90 The
district court dismissed the complaint relying on the Feres doc-
trine."' The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,"
distinguishing Feres on the basis that the negligent government
employee was a civilian rather than a member of the military. The
court of appeals justified its reversal on the grounds that the "ef-
fect of the suit on military discipline [is] to be the [Feres] doc-
trine's primary justification." 3 In a rehearing en banc, the Elev-
enth Circuit, relying on Shearer, sustained the findings of the
panel.9"
In a five to four opinion authored by Justice Powell,96 the Su-
preme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's analysis, noting that
"[t]his Court has never deviated from [its] characterization of the
Feres bar." 98 Justice Powell also noted that Congress had not
"changed this standard in the close to forty years since it was ar-
86. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 n.4.
87. Cooley, cited at note 55, at 981.
88. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
89. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 683.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 758 F.2d
660 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir. 1986), reinstated 779 F.2d 1492 (11th
Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
93. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 684.
94. Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S.
681 (1987).
95. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Black-
mun and O'Connor.
96. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686.
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ticulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, Congress 'pos-
sesses a ready remedy' to alter a misinterpretation of its intent.
97
In re-emphasizing the "incident to service test" of Feres, the Su-
preme Court formulated the following explanation for the doctrine:
First, "[tjhe relationship between the Government and members of its
armed forces is 'distinctively federal in character'." 9'
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death
benefits is an independent reason why the Feres doctrine bars suit for ser-
vice-related injuries. In Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose
of the FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it
incidentally benefitted those already well provided for, it appears to have
been unintentional."99
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service mem-
bers against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are
barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the "type[s] of claims that, if
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs
at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."' 00
In justifying the reversal, the Supreme Court did not conduct an
in-depth analysis into why Johnson's death met the third Feres
argument. In explaining why the action against a civilian govern-
ment employee of the FAA should be dismissed, the Court merely
indicated in a footnote:
Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities."'
The Johnson Court went on to hold that "[b]ecause Johnson
was acting pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military disci-
pline is substantial.' ' °2 Justice Powell specifically ruled that the
Feres doctrine was applicable to bar recovery. 0 3
The Supreme Court again relied on the incident to service test
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 689 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 143).
99. Id. at 689-90 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 140).
100. Id. at 690 (quoting Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59).
101. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690 n.11. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 691-92.
103. Id. at 692.
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in United States v. Stanley,10 4 to bar recovery of a former service-
man against the United States for injuries sustained as a result of
the involuntary administration of lysergic acid diethylamide
("LSD").06 Stanley filed a Bivens action'0 6 for money damages al-
leging a violation of his constitutional rights.0 7 Stanley argued
that the Feres doctrine should not apply since the defendants were
not Stanley's military superiors, and possibly were civilian person-
nel, so that there was no impact on the chain of command. 10 8 Jus-
tice Scalia, in his opinion for the majority, noted:
Stanley and the lower courts may well be correct that Chappell impli-
cated the military chain-of-command concerns more directly than do the
facts alleged here; in the posture of this case, one must assume that at least
some of the defendants were not Stanley's superior officers, and that he was
not acting under orders from superior officers when he was administered
LSD.,o0
Despite this admission and the fact that Scalia found Chappell
not controlling on the subject of the officer-subordinate relation-
ship,11 ° the majority indicated that the "incident to service test"
prevailed"' and that this test constituted the "special factors" dis-
cussed in Bivens."2
II. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
As noted in Johnson,"3 Congress has had sufficient opportunity
to amend the FTCA or the Veterans Benefits Act to modify or
abolish the Feres doctrine. Although no legislation has been en-
acted, two bills to allow military members to sue for medical mal-
104. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
105. LSD is a hallucinogenic drug taken orally. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, §304.50 (3d ed. rev. 1987). Use
of hallucinogens can result in maladaptive behavioral changes, perceptual changes and phys-
ical symptoms. These include anxiety, depression, paranoid ideation, fear of losing one's
mind, impaired judgment and social functioning, hallucinations, illusions, synesthesias,
sweating, vision blurring and tremors. Id. at §305.30.
106. A "Bivens action" is based on the remedy established in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This remedy allows
a citizen to bring an action against the United States for deprivation of civil rights by fed-
eral officers or employees acting under color of law.
107. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672.
108. Id. at 679.
109. Id. at 680.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 680-81.
112. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
113. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690.
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practice have passed the House of Representatives, only to face de-
feat in the Senate.
House Resolution 1054, introduced in the 100th Congress by
Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts, was passed 312-
61,114 but died in the Senate. An almost identical bill; House Reso-
lution 536, was passed by the House the next year. 1 5 Again, the
Senate failed to enact the bill. Despite the support in the House of
Representatives, it does not appear that Congress will provide a
legislative remedy in the near future.
III. FERES DOCTRINE RATIONALE
As previously discussed, there were four justifications for the
Feres doctrine, the three discussed in Feres itself and the military
discipline explanation delineated in Brown and relied upon in
Shearer. While these grounds may have some credence in the nor-
mal relationship between the serviceman and his superior, there is
little or no nexus between these justifications and malpractice in
the military hospitals. The Supreme Court itself has rejected one
argument and the others do not stand up to close scrutiny.
A. Parallel Liability Rationale
The parallel liability explanation,"' conspicuously absent from
the majority opinion in Johnson, had previously been abrogated in
Indian Towing Co. v. United States.17 In Indian Towing, the Su-
preme Court rejected the "parallel private liability" theory to bar
recovery against the Coast Guard for the negligent operation of a
lighthouse. 1 8 This holding was echoed in Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States," '9 and United States v. Muniz.2 0 Muniz expressly pro-
vided that the government's liability was no longer limited to cir-
cumstances in which there was "analogous private liability." ''
This reflected Justice Black's view in Rayonier that, although
holding the Forest Service liable for negligent fire fighting was
"novel and unprecedented," the "purpose of the Tort Claims Act
was to ... establish novel and unprecedented governmental liabil-
114. H.R. 1054, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
115. H.R. 536, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
116. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
117. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
118. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 66-69.
119. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
120. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
121. Id. at 159.
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ity.' 2 2 Accordingly, the "parallel liability" objective was consid-
ered to be defunct.
123
B. Distinctive Federal Character Rationale
The Muniz Court disposed of the second Feres explanation, the
distinctive federal character requirement. Muniz, which dealt with
actions by federal prisoners against prisons guards for negligence,
indicated that any adverse effect of the application of various state
laws was "a matter of conjecture rather than of reality.' 1 24 The
Supreme Court specifically concluded that medical malpractice ac-
tions in the federal prison system could be adjudged through the
application of nonuniform state laws without causing a disruption
to the administration of the prison.
12 5
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Johnson, the "distinc-
tive federal character" basis was the result of a concern by the
Feres Court that it would be unfair to make a soldier's recovery
dependent upon where he was injured. 126 Justice Scalia pointed
out, however, that "nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be worse
than (what Feres provides), uniform nonrecovery.'
' 2
7
The "distinctive federal character" reasoning has only been ap-
plied to military personnel. As discussed in Muniz, it was not ap-
plied to federal prisoners, who actually have less say than military
personnel as to where they are housed. Nor has it been applied to
dependents of military personnel or military retirees, who make up
two thirds of all patients treated at military hospitals.128 While ad-
mittedly retirees have a choice of where they live, dependents of
active duty personnel have no more choice than their active duty
sponsors. Likewise, service members who bring tort actions against
civilians are limited to the state to which they have been assigned.
In arguing for the rejection of this reasoning, Justice Scalia noted
that "[t]here seems to me nothing 'unfair' about a rule that says
that just as a serviceman injured by a negligent civilian must resort
to state tort law, so must a serviceman injured by a negligent Gov-
122. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319.
123. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
124. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 161.
125. Id. at 161.
126. Johnson, 481 U.S. 695-96 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43).
127. Id..





While it is true that there is a definite federal flavor in the con-
nection between the government and the military, this flavor exists
between the government and other federal departments as well. As
Justice Marshall indicated in his dissent in Stencel Aero:
It is true of course that the military performs "a unique nationwide func-
tion".. . but so do the Bureau of the Census, the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service and many other agencies of the Federal Government. These
agencies, like the military, may have personnel and equipment in all parts
of the country.1
3 0
The same reasoning holds true for almost all federal agencies. In
many cases, civilian governmental employees have no more of a
choice of domicile than their military counterparts. For example, if
an FBI agent is transferred to Butte, Montana, he packs up and
goes just like his military counterpart. Yet the FBI agent can re-
cover under the FTCA, the military member cannot.
C. Generous Military Compensation Rationale
The third basis for the Feres doctrine is the existence of the
"generous military compensation."' 3 ' The Veteran's Benefits Act
("VBA")13 2 compensates military personnel for injuries or death
without regard to whether the injury was "incident to service."' 33
In relying on this approach, however, the Court ignored the fact
that recovery was allowed under both Brooks's4 and Brown,36 de-
spite the fact that both petitioners received veterans benefits for
their injuries.' Additionally, unlike the provisions for the civilian
compensation program, 3 7 there is no express declaration that this
is an exclusive remedy. 3 8 It is also interesting to note that the
Muniz Court held that an alternative compensation system did not
necessarily preclude an action for negligence under the FTCA.' 9
The Feres court went to great pains to demonstrate that the
129. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 696 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
130. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 675 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
131. Id. at 672.
132. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-663 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
133. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
134. 337 U.S. at 54.
135. 348 U.S. at 113.
136. Cooley, cited at note 55, at 981.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1988).
138. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 675 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
139. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 160.
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statutory recoveries "compare extremely favorably with those pro-
vided by most workman's compensation statutes. 1 40 Although the
computations showed a favorable recovery compared to the state
statutes of 1950, no one would seriously contend that the provi-
sions for veterans disability payments have kept pace with the
medical malpractice award explosion.
Computation of disability retired benefits under the VBA is
based upon the higher of the following methods:
Percentage Method: Multiply the active duty
(% Method) base pay by the
percent of disability.
Years of Service Method: Multiply the member's
(YOS Method) years of active service
by 2.5% then multiply the
result by the member's
base pay.
1 41
Disability Severance Pay is computed by multiplying the
monthly active duty base pay by 2 and then multiplying the result
by the number of years of active service up to 12 years. "
For example, a 34-year old Navy or Coast Guard Chief Petty
Officer (pay grade E-7) with sixteen years of active service, making
$1872 per month, found unfit at 20% disability receives only
$44,928 severance pay and $748.80 per month pension. s Assuming
the patient lives for 36 years, the total compensation is $323,481.60
in compensation plus the $44,928.00 in severance pay for a less
than princely total of $368,409.60.
A person of lower rank with less time in service will fare worse.
Let us take the example of a 22-year old Marine Corps Corporal
(pay grade E-4) with four years of service and a base pay of
$1042.20 per month who also suffers a 20% disability. In addition
to $8337.60 in severance pay, the Corporal will receive a monthly
140. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
141. THE UNITED STATES NAVY DISABILITY COUNSELLOR'S GUIDE, 9-1 to 9-4 (1992).
142. Id. at 9-8.
143. Computations are as follows:
MONTHLY PENSION:
% Method: ($1872)(20%) = $364.40*
YOS Method: (16 Yrs)(2.5%)($18 7 2 ) = $748.80
* The pension is always the greater of the retirement percentage method and the years of
service method.
SEVERANCE PAY: ($1872)(2)(12 Yrs) = $44,928.00
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disability pension of $208.44.14 If the E-4 lives to the age of 70, his
''generous military compensation" will be $120,061.44 retirement
pay and $8337.60 severance pay for a total lifetime package of
$128,399.04 to tide the young person over for the next 48 years.
While it is understood that these stipends are normally tax free
and that malpractice suits often result in large contingency fees for
attorneys, the Supreme Court needs to reconsider these payments
in light of civilian jury awards for like disabilities to determine
whether the present disparity meets the protective intentions of
the Feres Court.
D. Military Discipline Rationale
The fourth ground for the Feres doctrine, the "military disci-
pline justification" set forth in Brown, has been called by at least
one commentator "the only remaining theory relied upon in John-
son that adequately supports the doctrine.
'145
While there is no doubt that the courts should stay out of deci-
sions unique to the armed forces that "would involve the judiciary
in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline
and effectiveness,' ' 0 the question remains as to whether medical
malpractice meets that test.
1. Relationship Between Military Doctors and Their Patients
In analyzing this argument, the first consideration to be ex-
amined is the relationship between the military doctors and their
patients. In Bailey v. DeQuevedo,"7 the Third Circuit held that
medical officers have a command function over servicemen in mili-
tary hospitals. While this is true, normally these officers are not
seeing patients. Even if they are physicians, they are usually too
busy with the administrative requirements of running a hospital to
perform a treatment function. In Navy hospitals, which serve both
Navy and Marine Corps personnel, commanding officers of hospi-
144. Computations are as follows:
MONTHLY PENSION:
% Method: ($1042.20)(20%) = $208.44*
YOS Method: (4 Yrs)(2.5%)($1042.20) = $104.22
* The pension is always the greater of the retirement percentage method and the
years of service method.
SEVERANCE PAY: ($1042.20)(2)(4 Yrs) = $8337.60
145. Cooley, cited at note 55, at 1001-02.
146. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59.
147. 375 F.2d 72 (3d. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
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tals are often Medical Service Corps officers who are non-physician
health care administrators. Accordingly, the "serviceman's associa-
tion with a government physician is unlike the typical relationship
between an enlisted man and his superior officers.
'148
Federal law, specifically the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"), gives military officers the right to demand the strict
obedience of their subordinates for all lawful orders, 14' and pro-
vides the death penalty for disobedience in time of war.15 0 Even
disrespect towards a superior commissioned officer can result in
punishment by a court-martial.1 51 The crux of the "peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors"15 is the need to
subordinate the individual to the needs of the unit. As the Su-
preme Court pointed out in Chappell, because the demands of dis-
cipline cannot be taught on the battlefield, "immediate compli-
ance" to orders must become a reflex based on habit.
153
2. Medical Officers in the Military Environment
Physicians, or Medical Officers as they are called in the military,
perform medical functions in a medical environment that is
"largely removed from the mainstream of military activities and is
free from many of the trappings that characterize service life.
1 54
The Navy, which also furnishes doctors and dentists for the
Marine Corps, expressly separates medical officers from the officers
of the line, commonly known as line officers.1 55 Medical Officers are
considered part of the "staff corps" and are grouped together with
Supply, Chaplain, Civil Engineer, Dental and Nurse Corps Of-
ficers."' They are specifically detailed to noncombatant duties
under domestic law 57 and the Geneva Convention. '58 Additionally,
148. Brian P. Cain, Military Medical Malpractice and the Feres Doctrine, 20 GA. L.
REv. 497, 521 (1986).
149. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 90(2), 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1988).
150. Id.
151. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1988).
152. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
153. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
154. Cain, cited at note 147, at 519.
155. Line officers are those who are not restricted in the performance of duty or who
are designated for special duties. 10 U. S. Navy Reg., art. 1001 (1990).
156. Id.
157. Id. at art. 1062.
158. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Art. 36-37, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3340 T.I.A.S.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1949); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
1993
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they are precluded from taking command of naval bases, ship-
yards, ships, submarines or air activities. 59 The Navy clearly sepa-
rates the military from the medical functions on board hospital
ships. Here, the commanding officer of the embarked naval hospi-
tal reports to the commanding officer of the ship (a line officer) for
military matters. The line officer is responsible for all military
functions of the ship but "shall not exercise control within the hos-
pital."'6 0 In other words, since medical officers are normally sepa-
rated from all line functions normally associated with war or com-
bat, the military discipline rationale loses its credence as it applies
to medical malpractice.
3. Existing Avenues of Redress under Military Law
The Court's fascination with the "peculiar and special relation-
ship of the soldier to his superiors,""'i ignores the fact that junior
servicemen are provided other avenues of redress within the mili-
tary that directly affect the superior-subordinate relationship. In
the Navy and Marine Corps, for example, any person may commu-
nicate directly with his or her commanding officer,""2 and seek re-
dress for any wrong committed by a superior not the commanding
officer.'13 In the event the complaint is against the commanding
officer, or if the complainant is dissatisfied with the commanding
officer's resolution of the complaint, the complainant may seek re-
dress under Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.6
All of these remedies are available to all members of the military
service against line and staff officers alike. It is absurd to think
that a medical malpractice case against the United States (not the
individual medical officer) will do more to undermine military dis-
Article 43(2), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
159. 10 U. S. Navy Reg., art. 1054-58 (1990).
160. Id. at art. 1029.
161. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
162. 11 U. S. Navy Reg., art. 1151 (1990).
163. Id. at art. 1150.
164. Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding
officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress,
may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint
to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against
whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall ex-
amine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong com-
plained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true
statement of that complaint with the proceedings had thereon.
10 U.S.C. § 938 (1988).
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cipline than the initiation of an Article 138 complaint of wrong.
Failure to allow for a civil remedy for medical malpractice may
result in even more draconian measures. Military personnel who
have been injured through the negligence of a medical officer could
proffer charges under Article 92(3) of the UCMJ, dereliction of
duty. 1 5 The fact that the person injured is junior to the doctor, or
for that matter even a direct subordinate of the doctor, is not con-
trolling because any person subject to the UCMJ can report the
offense.' 66 Irrespective of the rank of the accuser, a preliminary in-
quiry into reported offenses must be made pursuant to the Rules
for Court-Martial.
67
While there is no documented case of a military person charging
a superior in this manner, the Navy has charged a medical officer
with dereliction of duty, involuntary manslaughter and negligent
homicide arising out of alleged malpractice at the National Naval
Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland. 6 The Navy and Marine
Corps Court of Military Review, in an en banc opinion,' ruled that
the government had failed to prove the physician guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 69 The court was able to make its finding of in-
sufficient evidence pursuant to Article 66 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,'7 0 which allows for a reviewing court to make
165. Article 92(3) of the UCMJ provides: "Any person subject to this chapter who is
derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
10 U.S.C. § 892 (1988).
166. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1988).
167. The applicable Rules for Court-Martial provide:
Rule 301. Report of offense.
(a) Who may report. Any person may report an offense subject to trial by court-
martial.
(b) To whom reports conveyed for disposition. Ordinarily, any military authority who
receives a report of an offense shall forward as soon as practicable the report and any
accompanying information to the immediate commander of the suspect. Competent
authority superior to that commander may direct otherwise.
R. Court Martial 301, Manual Court Martial (1984).
Rule 303. Preliminary inquiry into reported offenses
Upon receipt of information that a member of the command is accused or suspected
of committing an offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the immediate com-
mander shall make or cause to be made a preliminary inquiry into the charges or
suspected offenses.
R. Court Martial 303, Manual Court Martial (1984).
168. United States v. Billig, 26 M.J. 744 (1988). In this case, Doctor Billig was con-
victed of 12 specifications of willful dereliction of duty, four specifications of involuntary
dereliction of duty, two specifications of dereliction of duty through culpable inefficiency,
two specifications of involuntary manslaughter and one specification of the lesser included
offense of negligent homicide. Id. at 746-47.
169. Id.
170. 10 U.S.C. § 866.
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findings of fact as well as law."' In doing so, the court expressly
declined to decide the issue of whether a military physician can be
held criminally liable for negligence. " 2
IV. THE EQUITY OPTION
The bar against recovery by military members only applies to
suits for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 17 Nothing in
this doctrine precludes suits in equity.17 4 Actions in equity which
are designed to force a military department to reverse a course of
action or otherwise limit its discretion to act would certainly do
more to undermine military discipline than an action for money
damages against the United States. The action for money damages
is more abstract, in that it is being brought against the great mon-
olith, the United States government. Injunctive relief, however, is
more personal in nature and generally affects the chain of com-
mand more directly.
In Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense,7 1 for ex-
ample, a United States District Court ordered the Navy to rein-
state Meinhold, an admittedly gay sailor, who had been discharged
from the Navy due to homosexuality. 176 Meinhold's commanding
officer indicated that "re-integrating Meinhold back into the
squadron ha[d] been difficult, and struck a 'discordant note with
the troops.' "177 Some other aviators had refused to fly with
Meinhold, and he was being assigned only to flight crews that had
volunteered to accept him. 178 The commanding officer further
noted that over 100 hours had been spent by the squadron's senior
management on issues relating to Meinhold 79 with a resulting
degradation in the squadron's "efficiency and mission focus" as
well as morale. 80
171. Billig, 26 M.J. at 757.
172. Id. at 761.
173. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
174. Geiger v. United States, 707 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1983), allowing medical officer to
sue for injunctive relief and habeas corpus for release from military obligations; Smith v.
Orr, 855 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988), allowing Air Force captain to sue to preclude separation
from active duty. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), allowing female officer to sue
to change the military pay regulations on equal protection grounds.
175. 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
176. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp at 1455.







Whatever the merits of the debate on allowing gays into the mil-
itary, it can hardly be denied that the Meinhold incident has been
more intrusive than any medical malpractice suit against the sov-
ereign could be. It is inconsistent to allow such intrusions while
continuing to bar damage suits under the military discipline rule of
Brown and Johnson.
V. CONCLUSION
While there are substantial reasons for the civilian courts to
steer clear of military matters, the general rule should not be ap-
plied to medical malpractice. As this comment has discussed, the
relationship between a medical officer and patient is not the type
that would jeopardize military discipline. Additionally, harsh rem-
edies already exist under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
that make a simple malpractice suit pale by comparison. Finally,
this policy is inconsistent with allowing injunctive relief, a signifi-
cantly more intrusive action normally directed at the chain of com-
mand, which directly and negatively impacts military discipline.
The ban on malpractice suits by military members against the
United States gives military hospitals little incentive to police
themselves. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") has recom-
mended a centralized Department of Defense malpractice informa-
tion system. ' The lack of such a centralized system denigrates the
ability of the department to track malpractice cases since doctors
are periodically transferred from one hospital to another. Absent
any investigation and confirmation of wrongdoing, malpractice
charges will not be documented in the officer's Report of Fitness or
Efficiency Report.
182
The GAO further indicated that there is "no assurance that mal-
practice incidents involving active duty service members will even
be investigated or reviewed by the military claims services." ' The
report goes on to note that the Army refuses to investigate mal-
practice claims from active duty personnel since their interest in
investigations is for settlement purposes. With the Feres doctrine
barring recovery, the Army argued that there is no need to
investigate.'"
No one is proposing that a military person be allowed to sue for
181. 133 CONG. REC. S11086 (daily ed. June 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
182. See e.g. 1611.1A NAVY MIL. PERSONNEL COM. INST. (March 26, 1990).




mistakes made under combat conditions.185 Overturning the
Feres doctrine would allow recovery only under the FTCA, which
specifically precludes acts arising out of combat or foreign ser-
vice.186 It would eliminate the judicially crafted classification that
has resulted in members of the armed forces being relegated to
second class citizen status.187
Although the nation is concerned about the size of the federal
budget and the deficit, abrogation of the Feres doctrine will result
in relatively minor costs. The Congressional Budget Office esti-
mated in 1988 that the cost would be $25 million.188 Nor would this
action impact the increasingly scarce defense dollars, because all
judgments over $2500 would come not from the Department of De-
fense budget but from a special claims fund set up through the
Department of Justice.81
The Supreme Court has not addressed the specific question of
medical malpractice since the original Feres case. Given the reas-
sessment of the three original Feres considerations and the adop-
tion of the military discipline justification in Brown, it is time for
the Supreme Court to reexamine the narrow issue of medical mal-
practice. Of the five member majority in Johnson,90 Justices Pow-
ell and White have departed the Court. Justice O'Connor, given
her partial dissent in Stanley, e'9 may be wavering or at least has
drawn the line at Stanley-type experimentation. Only Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun remain as solid proponents
of Feres under all circumstances.
Justice Scalia who dissented in Johnson,' wrote the majority
opinion for Stanley, but in doing so, relied almost entirely on the
Chappell "special factors test"'9 3 as it applied to the Feres "inci-
dent to service test."' 94 In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Scalia
makes clear the distinction between the lack of justification for the
Feres exception to the FTCA and the need for an exception in a
185. 134 CONG. REC. H354,358 (daily ed. February 17, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
186. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(j)-2680(k) (1988).
187. 134 CONG. REC. S4297 (daily ed. April 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
188. 134 CONG. REc. H354, 355 (daily ed. February 17, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
189. Id.
190. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 682.
191. 483 U.S. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84.
194. Id. at 684.
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Bivens action. 95 Nothing in Stanley indicates that Scalia would
support the application of the Feres doctrine in anything other
than a Bivens action.
In addition to Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, who dissented in
both Johnson and Stanley, is still on the court. None of the re-
maining Justices, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas or Ginsburg, have ad-
dressed a Feres case.
Given the new faces on the Supreme Court and the lack of a
substantive nexus between medical malpractice and military disci-
pline, as discussed herein, a new approach to the Feres doctrine
may find a warmer reception. The Court may be persuaded to cre-
ate an exception to the Feres doctrine for malpractice in noncom-
bat procedures performed within the United States.
Action in this regard is vital to correct this inequitable
travesty. The military routinely places people like Joyce Atkinson
in life threatening situations. While doing so, it has deprived her of
a benefit available to virtually ever other United States citizen, the
right to sue for medical malpractice. Denying people like Joyce At-
kinson access to the courts solely because they wear the uniform of
the United States Armed Forces is an aberration that is long over-
due for correction.
John B. Wells
195. Id. at 682 n.5.
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